Rail Privatisation – How Is It Going? by Nash, C.
   
 
 
 
White Rose Research Online 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
 
 
 
 
Institute of Transport Studies
University of Leeds 
 
 
This is an ITS Working Paper produced and published by the University of 
Leeds. ITS Working Papers are intended to provide information and encourage 
discussion on a topic in advance of formal publication. They represent only the 
views of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views or approval of the 
sponsors.  
 
 
White Rose Repository URL for this paper: 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/2104
 
 
 
Published paper 
Chris Nash (1997) Rail Privatisation – How Is It Going? Institute of Transport 
Studies, University of Leeds, Working Paper 497
 
 
 
 
 
White Rose Consortium ePrints Repository 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk 
 
UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS 
Institute for Transport Studies 
 
 
 
ITS Working Paper 497 
 
March 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RAIL PRIVATISATION - HOW IS IT GOING? 
 
 
 
 
C.A. NASH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work was sponsored by The Economic and Social Research Council.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ITS Working Papers are intended to provide information and encourage discussion on a topic in 
advance of formal publication.  They represent only the views of the authors, and do not 
necessarily reflect the views or approval of the sponsors. 
 
© 1997 Institute for Transport Studies, Leeds, UK 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .................................................................................................................................... i 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 1 
2. RAILTRACK AND THE ROLLING STOCK LEASING COMPANIES.................................................. 1 
3. FRANCHISING................................................................................................................................................ 2 
4. FREIGHT.......................................................................................................................................................... 3 
4. OTHER BUSINESSES .................................................................................................................................... 4 
5. ASSESSMENT.................................................................................................................................................. 4 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................................... 6 
© 1997 Institute for Transport Studies, Leeds, UK 
 
i
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
This paper was undertaken as part of an ESRC financed project on the effects of rail privatisation.  I 
am grateful to John Preston and Gerard Whelan for comments on an earlier version, but 
responsibility for opinions expressed and any errors are solely my own. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The 1993 Railways Act provided for the privatisation of British Rail in the form of franchising of 
passenger services and outright sale of all other parts of the business. The privatisation was 
unusually complex, with the existing single organisation being divided into more than 80 separate 
companies, the intention being to create competition not just in the form of competing train 
operating companies, but also for the supply of services such as rolling stock and track maintenance, 
wherever possible. The aim of this paper is to review events since the process of rail privatisation in 
Britain really started in April 1994. It is based partly on the publications of the relevant bodies and 
the technical press but partly on conversations with those in the industry. It is divided into five 
sections, looking in turn at Railtrack and the ROSCOs, the passenger franchising process, the freight 
sector and other businesses before seeking to draw some overall conclusions. 
 
2. RAILTRACK AND THE ROLLING STOCK LEASING COMPANIES  
 
As from April 1 1994, the rail industry was substantially reorganised ready for privatisation. In 
particular, Railtrack was set up as a separate publicly owned company to own and manage the 
infrastructure and sell access to it to train operating companies. Initial track access charges for 
passenger operators were determined by the Department of Transport on the basis of recovering all 
costs including replacement of assets and a rate of return of 5.6% on the modern equivalent value of 
the asset base, to be gradually raised to 8% (Nash.1996). Charges took the form of a high fixed 
charge, plus a low variable charge per train kilometre, varying with the type of stock, the latter 
simply designed to recover wear and tear costs (and the cost of electricity where electric traction is 
used). Freight charges were to be negotiated on a flow by flow basis according to what the traffic 
could bear, as would charges for new open access operators and for changes in the access 
arrangements for existing operators.  A new body, the Office of the Rail Regulator, was set up with 
various responsibilities including regulating track access charges, and in his first review, the Rail 
Regulator determined that the track access charges for passenger services were higher than was 
necessary for Railtrack to meet its commitments and should be reduced by 8% immediately, and by 
a further 2% per annum up to the year 2000. (ORR, 1995). In May 1996, Railtrack was privatised 
by the sale of shares, raising a total of nearly £2b. 
 
At the time Railtrack was set up, many of the Train Operating Companies reported considerable 
concern about the loss of control over key assets which determine their quality of service. However, 
as part of the subsequently negotiated track access agreements, a performance regime was included 
under which Railtrack has to compensate Train Operating Companies for delays or cancellations 
which are its responsibility and vice versa. Thus Railtrack has a very direct commercial interest in 
ensuring a high standard of performance. It is reported that punctuality and reliability have generally 
improved under the new regime (see for instance, Pegasus, Dec. 1996, p.1) which seems to be 
working well. However, operators continue to complain about slowness in negotiating changes to 
access arrangements, and - partly to speed up the consideration of new flows of traffic - the new 
freight operator is understood to be seeking to put its charges on the basis of a two part tariff similar 
to that faced by passenger operators, rather than the existing flow by flow basis. 
 
More concern has been expressed about the level of investment. The Regulator determined charges 
at a level which should permit the renewal of assets so as to at least ensure the continuation of rail 
services at current levels and qualities.  However, he has expressed concern that investment is not 
taking place at the necessary rate.  The pressure on Railtrack to renew its assets comes from the fact 
that otherwise in the longer term its performance will deteriorate, triggering penalty payments. 
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Doubts have been expressed about whether this is an adequate incentive, and the Regulator has 
threatened further action if he is not satisfied with Railtrack's performance in this respect. 
 
At the same time as Railtrack was set up, the passenger rolling stock was placed into three new 
companies (the ROSCOs), and leasing agreements were set up between these and the various Train 
Operating Companies, which were at the time still within British Rail. These were based on charges 
which again included depreciation at replacement cost and interest, but with an offsetting reduction 
in the case of older stock on acount of its higher operating and maintenance costs. These companies 
were privatised by outright sale, in two cases to Management Buyouts and in one case to an 
internationl financial consortium, raising a total of some £1.8b. Both management buyouts have 
since been taken over at substantially increased prices, in one case by Stagecoach, which is also a 
train operator, raising issues for competition policy as the company concerned leases rolling stock to 
Stagecoach's rival train operators.  The takeover was permitted to proceed on condition that the 
ROSCO continued to be managed as a separate company and did not favour Stagecoach over other 
operators in its leasing terms. 
 
3. FRANCHISING 
 
Rail passenger services were reorganised into 25 Train Operating Companies to be franchised out to 
the private sector.  Responsibility for the franchising process rests with another new body - the 
Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), which sets minimum service standards (the 
Passenger Service Requirement) in terms of frequency, speed, and in some cases other criteria such 
as reliability and crowding, as well as controlling certain fares. OPRAF then invites bids in terms of 
the subsidy per annum that operators will require to run the services, usually on the basis of a 7 year 
franchise, but with the option of a longer franchise incorporating specific investments. 
 
Generally the Passenger Service Requirement stipulated services close to current levels for 
unprofitable services, but gave more freedom to operators where services were closer to commercial 
viability. In the case of London commuter services the emphasis was on the level of capacity 
provided during the peak. OPRAF has a duty to develop systematic criteria for taking decisions on 
support, and late in 1996 it published a consultation document suggesting that these should be based 
on a form of cost-benefit analysis, although ignoring user benefits when it was felt that these could 
be captured by the operator as revenue, and looking more broadly at environmental and economic 
implications of major projects (OPRAF, 1996). Clearly there was not time to develop these criteria 
in the first round of franchising, and therefore franchises for up to 15 years have been entered into 
more on the basis of preserving something close to the status quo than on the optimal use of support. 
Perhaps this was politically inevitable anyway, regardless of time contraints.  
 
The franchising process started with Great Western and South West Trains, which started operation 
in February 1996 and was completed early in 1997. It is thought that the franchise was almost 
always awarded to the lowest credible bid; the successful franchisees and their bids are shown in 
Table 1. Whilst the first two bids promised relatively low rates of reduction of subsidy, bids have 
become progressively more optimistic, culminating in the biggest and most complex franchise, Inter 
City West Coast, which was won by Virgin, promising to turn a £77m subsidy in the first year into a 
£220m premium payment to OPRAF in the last year of a 15 year franchise. Whilst the more 
ambitious bids clearly rely heavily on generating substantial increases in passenger revenue, it 
appears that also substantial cost reductions are anticipated and a start has already been made. For 
instance, several operators report a reduction in the number of drivers of the order of 30%, resulting 
from measures such as greater flexibility in shift length and an ending of the requirement that trains 
travelling at more than 110m.p.h. have two drivers in the cab.  
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Although a relatively small number of organisations were involved in bidding, the bidding appears 
to have been very competitive, with several serious bids for each franchise. The nature of the 
winning organisations is summarised in Table 2. It is seen that the bus industry dominates the scene, 
with a small number of successful management buyouts, a French conglomerate, Virgin, Sea 
Containers and a consultancy led company the other players.  The dominance of the bus industry 
has raised concerns about lack of competition where the franchisee is also the major bus operator in 
the district. One case, the takeover of the Midland Main Line by National Express, which also 
operates almost all the express coach services from the area in question, has been referred to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, but National Express was permitted to retain both sets of 
services on giving various undertakings about the future price and frequency of express coach 
services on the routes in question (MMC, 1996). 
 
Assuming a linear rate of decline of subsidy, over the first 7 years of subsidy the annual demands on 
the exchequer should be reduced by some £1,000m (Table 3). However, it is worth remembering 
that the new basis of charging for the use of infrastructure and operations led to the subsidy bill 
rising from £1.1b in 1993/4 to £2b in 1994/5 (Table 4). It will thus be several years before subsidies 
return to the level they were at before the process started in 1993/4.  In addition, there have been 
major transition costs, and the operating costs of OPRAF and ORR must be taken into account.  On 
the other hand, the taxpayer has benefitted from the proceeds of the sale of Railtrack, the ROSCO's 
and the other constituent parts of BR (maybe some £4.3b, but the costs of the privatisation process 
of at least £0.25b must be deducted from that - see Modern Railways Informed Sources, January 
1997) and the payments should provide for a higher level of investment than has been the case in the 
past.  It thus appears that, unless a high rate of subsidy reduction could have been achieved by 
British Rail without privatisation (and the performance of BR in the favourable economic climate of 
the 1980’s when it halved subsidy in real terms, should not be forgotten - see Nash and Preston, 
1992), the net outcome should not be the sort of big increase in costs that was initially feared, and 
may even be beneficial for the taxpayer, although not nearly as much so as implied by a simple 
examination of the trends in support in the franchise agreements. This also presupposes that these 
reductions in support are actually achieved (see section 5).  Some commentators include writing off 
of debt as part of the cost of privatisation, but we are only interested in the net effect on cash flows, 
and it is unlikely that interest on debt would have exceeded future borrowings. 
 
Whilst there was a virtual halt to new projects, particularly rolling stock replacement, whilst the 
privatisation process was underway, many of the franchise agreements do provide for substantial 
investment. These include substantial amounts of new rolling stock on the London Tilbury and 
Southend Line, South East Trains and Cross Country, and tilting trains for the West Coast Main 
Line, in conjunction with substantial renewal and upgrading by Railtrack. Elsewhere, innovative 
service patterns and higher frequencies have been offered, including the provision of a semifast 
service on the Midland Main line which will virtually double the number of train miles run. Again it 
should be remembered that British Rail itself had a record of introducing innovatory new and 
improved services particularly in the late 1980s so it should not be assumed that none of these 
innovations would have happened without privatisation. Moreover there are some developments 
which disadvantage passengers, such as more restrictions on the availability of fares by alternative 
routes, fewer cases of holding of connections (of course this actually benefits some passengers) and 
problems with the provision of passenger information (see section 5). Overall, however, it seems 
unlikely that passengers will be seriously disadvantaged by the changes if franchisees fulfil the 
conditions of their franchise agreements. 
4. FREIGHT 
 
In the freight sector, it was intended to create a competitive market within the rail mode. To this end 
the former BR Trainload freight sector was divided into three separate companies, and these, Rail 
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Exress Systems (the post and charter train operator) Railfreight Distribution (the operator of services 
to the continent of Europe via the Channel Tunnel) and Freightliner (operator of container services, 
principally to deep-sea ports) were all offered for sale separately. In addition open access was 
provided for any other operator who wished to run services, including existing freight customers 
who might wish to run their own trains. 
 
In the event all the BR freight businesses except Freightliner (which was bought by a Management 
Buyout) were obtained by the same company, English, Welsh and Scottish Railways (EWS), which 
is owned by a consortium led by a small US railroad, Wisconsin Central. Whilst two freight 
customers (National Power and British Nuclear Fuels) are running their own trains, there is little 
sign of any other entry into the market. It appears that there are still substantial barriers to entry in 
the form of the need to obtain a safety case, negotiate access arrangements with Railtrack and obtain 
staff with the necessary skills and knowledge (including drivers with the route knowledge to run the 
services proposed). Thus rail freight remains almost a monopoly. Arguably however this is a 
desirable outcome; EWS claim that there are considerable economies of scale in terms of reduced 
overheads, better utilisation of assets etc from having a single company and give the scale and 
geographical spread of the companies this seems plausible.  Competition from road haulage is 
sufficient to provide market discipline in most segments of the market. (Elsewhere, as for coal, the 
presence of customers large enough to run their own services if need be is another effective source 
of countervailing power, and rates for such traffic are believed to have fallen sharply). Certainly 
English Welsh and Scottish Railways have made a determined start on reducing costs and 
increasing traffic, and have set themselves the remarkable target of trebling rail freight tonne 
kilometres over 10 years. They have also begun reinvestment, with a substantial order for 250 
locomotives. 
 
4. OTHER BUSINESSES 
 
In addition to the three main business sectors described above, the privatisation has taken place of 
many other companies formed from parts of British Rail. Foremost amongst these are the 
infrastructure maintenance and renewal companies and the rolling stock heavy maintenance 
companies. These were sold to a mixture of existing engineering firms and management buyouts. 
Amongst the other companies privatised are included BR Business Systems, (responsible for 
computer and ticket issuing systems), BR Research, Rail Operational Research, engineering design 
offices, marketing organisations and many others.  
   
5. ASSESSMENT 
 
It appears from the above that the privatisation process has been completed  remarkably smoothly, 
in an extraordinarily short period of time.  In part this has been the result of a pragmatic approach to 
actual implementation which has seen many departures from original intentions - for instance, 
OPRAF has been willing to award longer franchises in return for promises of investment, open 
access has been limited, at least until 2001, and the freight monopoly outcome has already been 
commented upon. There are certainly areas which remain of concern.  For instance, surveys 
undertaken by the Consumers Association has found that the quality and impartiality of information 
on fares and services has been poor. Whilst many of their examples are extreme cases where 
cheaper fares available on very limited and unattractive services have not been mentioned, some are 
not, and the Regulator clearly perceives there to be a problem (ORR, 1997).  Another concern 
surrounds the inability of one of the first franchisees - South West Trains - to fulfil its Passenger 
Service Requirement regarding levels of service following a too rapid reduction in the number of 
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drivers.  An emergency timetable, cancelling many services, has been introduced.  Of course, 
Stagecoach will pay penalties to OPRAF for failing to fulfil the terms of its franchising agreement, 
but this early example of a new operator appearing to place cost cutting above its duty to provide 
services has renewed fears that service levels may suffer as a result of privatisation. 
 
Looking ahead, there remain potential problems. One surrounds the intention of the Regulator 
progressively to move towards open access for passenger operators (with the exception of Inter City 
West Coast services, where in return for the high level of investment required, protection from 
competition will continue throughout the 15 year franchise). Other work we have undertaken 
suggests that, whilst head on competition will tend to be unprofitable for the entrant, cream 
skimming entry with a few key trains may be profitable, and reduce the profits of the incumbent 
even if they are successful in retaliation. Scope for this may be limited by lack of track capacity 
unless incumbents are forced to surrender paths, however, as obviously cream skimmers would be 
looking for peak hour paths into the main termini. The most likely entrants of this type would be 
neighbouring franchisees. 
 
It can be seen from Table 3 that several franchisees are committed to a 7 year subsidy reduction 
which is more than 50% of current turnover.  For some, this will rest heavily on cost reductions but 
others are projecting big increases in revenue.  This raises the more general issue of what will 
happen if the franchisees are unable to secure the ambitious targets in terms of revenue increases on 
the basis of which many of them have made their bids. Apart from increased competition, the most 
likely cause of this is a downturn in the economy. In this situation, they have the right to reopen 
negotiations with OPRAF on the terms of their franchise, and if the problem is genuinely due to 
circumstances outside their own control, it appears likely that OPRAF will agree to some 
combination of cuts in services and increased subsidy. Should a franchisee become insolvent, then 
OPRAF would also obviously have to secure a replacement operator, and again the cost of this 
might be increased subsidies, poorer services or both.  The cost and difficulty of this might well 
incline OPRAF to renogotiate subsidies and service levels rather then face this situation.  Many 
sources in the industry believe that bidders assumed this to be the case in making such favourable 
bids. If they are only able to secure this performance in the face of favourable economic 
circumstances, then this reinforces the point that the achievement of British Rail in the favourable 
economic climate of the second half of the 1980’s, where it halved subsidies whilst expanding 
traffic, should also not be forgotten.  It is quite possible that a major reduction in subsidy with 
improved services could have been achieved without privatisation. 
 
Thus there remain uncertainties ahead and it is by no means clear that the outcome will necessarily 
be more favourable than it would have been under the old regime.  However, few observors would 
have imagined at the start of the process that it would be possible virtually to complete such a 
complicated privatisation process within the space of three years.  If franchisees are indeed able to 
fulfil the terms of their franchise agreement whilst at the same time operating at a profit, prospects 
for the railway industry look good. Only time will tell if this is indeed the case.   
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Table 1: Rail Franchises 
 
Franchise Franchise Length of Subsidy (£m) 
  Franchise 
(yrs) 
First 
Year 
Last 
Year 
Great Western MBO 10 59.9 31.6 
South West Trains Stagecoach 7 60.1 40.3 
InterCity East Coast Sea Containers 7 64.6 0 
Midland Main Line National Express 10 16.5 -10.0 
Gatwick Express National Express 15 -4.6 -22.6 
LTS Rail Prism 15 29.5 11.2 
South Central Connex 7 85.3 34.6 
Chiltern Railways MBO 7 16.5 2.9 
South East Trains Connex 15 125.4 -2.8 
South Wales & West Prism 7½ 70.9 38.1 
Cardiff Railways Prism 7½ 19.9 13.3 
Thames Trains MBO 7½ 33.2 0 
Island Railways Stagecoach 5 2.0 1.75 
Regional Railways North West G&W Holdings 10 191.9 125.5 
Regional Railways North East MTL 7 223.2 145.6 
North London Railways NEG 7½ 54.8 16.9 
Thameslink GOVIA 7 yrs 1 mth -2.5 -28.4 
ICWC Virgin 15 76.8 -220.3 
Scotrail NEG 7 280.1 202.5 
Central NEG 7 198.1 132.6 
Cross Country Virgin 15 112.9 -10 
Anglia GB Railways 7 yrs 3 mths 35.9 6.3 
Great Eastern First Bus 7 yrs 3 mths 29 -9.5 
West Anglia Great Northern PRISM 7 yrs 3 mths 52.9 -24.8 
Merseyrail MTL 7  80.7 60.0 
 
Source: Local Transport Today 13/3/97 
 
Note: Negative Subsidies indicate payment of a premium. 
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Table 2: Franchisees 
 
Franchisees No. of Franchises 
National Express 5 
Prism 4 
Virgin 2 
Gt Western Holdings 2 
Connex 2 
MTL 2 
Stagecoach 2 
Firstbus 1* 
Govia 1 
GB Railways 1 
Sea Containers 1 
  
Other MBO’s  2
 25 
of which   
bus operators 15 
MBO’s 3 
 
* Also participants in Great Western Holdings 
 
Source: Derived from Table 1.
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Table 3: Estimated Subsidy (£m) 
 
 1st yr 7th yr Final yr 
(where 
franchise is   
longer than 7 
years) 
7 yr Subsidy 
Reduction 
Current 
Turnover 
Great Western 59.9 40.09 31.6 19.81 156.0 
South West Trains 60.1 40.3  19.8 221.0 
InterCity East Coach 64.6 0 0 64.6 217.0 
Midland Main Line 16.5 -2.05 -10 18.55 58.0 
Gatwick Express -4.6 -13 -22.6 8.4 27.0 
LTS Rail 29.5 20.96 11.2 8.54 53.0 
South Central 85.3 34.6  50.7 158.0 
Chiltern Railways 16.5 2.9  13.6 22.0 
South East Trains 125.4 65.57 -2.8 59.8 215.0 
South Wales & West 70.9 38.1  32.8 40.0 
Cardiff Railways 19.9 13.3  6.6 5.7 
Thames Trains 33.2 0  33.2 46.0 
Island Railways 2 1.75  0.25 0.7 
Regional Railways North West 191.9  125.5 46.48 47.8 
Regional Railways North East 223.2 145.6  77.6 68.0 
North London Railways 54.8 16.9  37.9 54.0 
Thameslink -2.5 -28.4  25.9 76.0 
ICWC 77 -61.6 -220 138.6 219.0 
Scotrail 280.1 202.5  77.6 104.9 
Central 198.1 132.6  65.5 65.6 
Cross Country 112.9 55.55 -10 57.35 106.0 
Anglia 35.9 6.3  29.6 38.0 
Great Eastern 29 -9.5  38.5 120.0 
West Anglia Great 52.9 -24.8  77.7 119.8 
Merseyrail 80.7 60.0  20.7 18.7 
Total 1913.2 883.09  1030.11 2257.2 
 
Source: Local Transport Today 13/3/97.  Franchises of 7 years 1 month or 7 years 3 months have 
been treated as 7 years in this table. 
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Table 4: Grants to British Railways Board (£m) 
 
 1993/4 1994/5 
Public Source Obligation 930 1645 
PTE’s 105 259 
Level crossings 32 35 
Pensions 54 45 
Total 1121 1984 
 
Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 1996.  Table 1.17. 
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